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 1 
COMPETITIVE HARM FROM VERTICAL MERGERS 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction  
 The long-needed revision of the antitrust agencies’ Vertical 
Merger Guidelines (VMGs) is an important achievement.1  This essay 
examines them in light of the standards articulated in §7 of the Clayton 
Act. 
 As enacted in 1914, §7 of the Clayton Act did not apply to 
vertical mergers.  The statute referred to mergers that lessened 
competition “between” the merging firms.2  That is the anticipated 
competitive threat from a horizontal merger, as well as most potential 
competition mergers.3  The lessening of competition that occurs in a 
vertical merger is generally not between the merging firms, however, 
but between the post-merger firm and other firms who were not  parties 
to the merger.  In the simple vertical merger case, there was no 
competition between the merging firms prior to the merger. A few 
cases, such as Columbia Steel and Brown Shoe, were simultaneously 
vertical and horizontal because the parties operated in both the 
upstream and downstream markets.4  An important purpose of the 1950 
Clayton Act amendments was to add vertical mergers to the practices 
that fell within the statute. 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pa. Carey Law School and 
the Wharton School. 
1 United States Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Vertical 
Merger Guidelines (VMG) (June 30, 2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-
federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-
guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf. 
2 Original §7 applied to acquisitions “… where the effect of such acquisition 
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose 
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition….” 
3E.g. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
4Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. 
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). 
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 A principal motivator of the 1950 amendments was the 
Supreme Court’s 1948 Columbia Steel decision.  That decision had 
refused to condemn a vertical asset acquisition under the Sherman Act, 
largely because of ambiguities about market definition and market 
shares that the Court found to be too small.5  The purpose of the 1950 
§7 Amendments was threefold.  First, it was drafted to expand the 
reach of the statute to vertical mergers.  Second, the statute was 
amended so as to include both stock and asset acquisitions.  Third, the 
new provision applied the Clayton Act’s broader “may substantially 
lessen competition” standard to both vertical mergers and mergers by 
asset acquisition.6 The amendments were presumably intended to 
establish that the market share standards applied in the Columbia Steel 
case were too narrow. 
Prior to the amendments, the Supreme Court had also 
addressed the difference between the Sherman and Clayton Act 
standards of legality in another vertical case, although one that 
involved a contract practice rather than a merger. In Standard Stations 
(1949) the Court condemned exclusive dealing under §3 of the Clayton 
Act, which uses the same “may … substantially lessen competition” 
language.  The Court observed that the statute was “directed to 
prohibiting specific practices even though not covered by the broad 
terms of the Sherman Act….”7  The Court also declined to hold that 
the Sherman Act would condemn the restraint.8  So the clear message 
was that the Clayton Act’s injury language reached more broadly than 
the Sherman Act language in vertical cases. 
These important statutory differences notwithstanding, the 
sharp expansion in merger policy that occurred under the 1950 
Amendments was actually driven less by technical changes in the 
language of the revised statute than by the legislative history. That 
became clear in the Brown Shoe decision, which examined the 
legislative history at some length.   Brown Shoe was both horizontal 
and vertical.  Further, it was a stock acquisition, so the horizontal 
portion of the merger was already covered by the original Clayton Act.   
 
5Ibid. 
6See Id., 334 U.S. at 507, n. 7 (action was not brought under Clayton Act 
because it was an asset rather than a stock acquisition). 
7Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).  See Id. at 297, 300-301. 
8Id. at 314. 
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Relying on Reports from both the House and the Senate, however, 
Brown Shoe concluded that the amendments changed the standard of 
legality even under the “may substantially lessen competition” 
standard.  The revised statute was “intended to reach incipient 
monopolies and trade restraints outside the Sherman Act.”9  The Court 
concluded that the “dominant theme pervading congressional 
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was 
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the 
American economy.”10 
The Court also noted a 1947 FTC study citing “the danger to 
the American economy in unchecked corporate expansions through 
mergers.”  In addition, Brown Shoe observed, the legislative history 
reflected Congress’ belief in the “desirability of retaining ‘local 
control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses,“11 as well 
as “other values” that a “trend toward concentration” threatened.12 
Those other values were described as something other than 
“accelerated concentration of economic power on economic 
grounds.”13  Finally, the Court observed that repeated acquisitions in 
an industry could have a “cumulative effect,” and that “control of the 
market * * * may be achieved not in a single acquisition but as the 
result of a series of acquisitions.”14 
One prominent antitrust economist from the period hailed that 
Report as representing the FTC’s increased use of economics in 
merger cases.15  Then Harvard Law Professor Derek Bok gave the 
 
9Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 318 n. 32, citing  H.R.Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. 8 (‘Acquisitions of stock or assets have a cumulative effect,); S.Rep. 
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4—5, U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, 1950, 
p. 4296 (‘The intent here * * * is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in 
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would 
justify a Sherman Act proceeding.’). 
10Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-316 (1962). 
11Brown Shoe. supra, discussing FTC, The Present Trend of Corporate 
Mergers and Acquisitions (1947), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 515 at 300-
317 (1950). 
12Brown Shoe, Ibid. 
13Id. at 316.  
14Id. at 317-318 & n. 32. 
15See Jesse W. Markham, The Federal Trade Commission’s Use of 
Economics, 64 COL. L. REV. 405, 412-413 (1964).  Markham was an 
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statute more qualified praise, but he criticized the legislative history 
for “the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of 
concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.”16 To 
be sure, he observed, Congress expressed a concern about the “need 
for preserving competition.”  However, “competition appeared to 
possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered on the 
virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in 
economic literature.”17 
 With Brown Shoe the Supreme Court embarked on a 
substantial expansion of merger law, often on rationales that did more 
harm than good to competition. Among these rationales were 
exaggerated theories of harm as well as the perverse idea that mergers 
should be condemned because of efficiencies that served to harm 
rivals. 
It is important not to cast too much of the blame for this on the 
Supreme Court, however. First, the legislative history supported it.  
Second, all of the Supreme Court’s expansive decisions during this 
period were brought by either the Antitrust Division or the Federal 
Trade Commission.18  The Court merely did what the enforcement 
agencies requested, condemning mergers on small markets shares that 
would never be challenged today, and on rationales, including the 
creation of efficiencies that harmed competing business or higher 
concentration for its own sake.19  The Supreme Court was no more to 
blame than Congress and the enforcement agencies.  Indeed, in cases 
of statutory interpretation it had a duty to follow the statute, not to 
make its own economic policy. 
 
economics professor at both Princeton and Harvard Business School, as 
well as chief economists for the FTC. 
16Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of law and 
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).  Bok later became President of 
Harvard University. 
17Id. at 236-237.  For further analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok 
and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 J. L. REFORM 515 (1988). 
18E.g., Brown Shoe, supra; United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 
270 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
19E.g., In re Foremost Dairies, Inc. 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962), modified, 
67 F.T.C. 282 (1965) (condemning a merger because its efficiencies would 
give the firm a “decisive advantage” over competitors). 
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 Subsequently, both Harvard and Chicago School thinking 
pushed back at the aggressive attitudes about industrial concentration, 
as well as the idea that merger-induced efficiency was an affirmative 
harm.20  But the Chicago School went much further.  Particularly in 
the writings of Robert Bork, vertical practices including mergers came 
to be viewed as virtually always harmless.21  These positions were 
heavily reflected in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, which were written 
during the high point of Chicago School influence on government 
policy and were the most recent previous Guidelines to address the 
topic of vertical mergers prior to the 2020 Guidelines.22 
  The economic writing since the 1980s has largely repudiated 
both the Brown Shoe view and the Bork view of vertical mergers.  
Today vertical mergers are regarded with less suspicion overall than 
horizontal mergers.  Nevertheless, they still pose competitive threats 
in some cases, with harm measured by realistic threats of reduced 
output, higher prices, or harms to innovation – precisely the things that 
Derek Bok had mentioned.  The 2020 VMGs are a first public attempt 
to capture these concerns in a way capable of being implemented in 
enforcement policy.  They need not be the final word.  Just as the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they are very likely destined to go 
through periodic revisions as enforcers acquire greater experience. 
Proof Requirements 
 When the government is suing as enforcer it need not quantify 
the harm to competition other than showing that it “may be … 
substantial.”23 One qualification is that if a factually supported 
efficiency defense is established (something that the statute itself does 
not acknowledge), then the person with the burden of showing merger-
specific efficiencies must show that these would be sufficient to 
prevent prices from rising above premerger levels.  Proof of that would 
require quantification at least in cases where substantial merger-
specific efficiencies have been shown and the balance between price 
 
20See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF, CHS. 9 & 10 (1978); 4 & 5 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 9 (1980). 
21Bork, id. at Chs. 11, 14-15. 
22 Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines §4.2, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines. 
23 15 U.S.C. §18. 
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increase effects and efficiency effects is close enough to require 
measurement. 
 Private plaintiffs can also challenge vertical mergers, and 
presumably under the same substantive standards.  If they are seeking 
treble damages, however, they must quantify their injury sufficiently 
to support a reasonable estimate of damages.24  If they are seeking only 
an injunction they must show “threatened loss or damage,”25 which 
does not require quantification.  For purposes of damages, the nature 
of the proof depends on the identity of the plaintiff.  For example, a 
customer complaining that a merger produced an overcharge would 
have to be able to quantify a post-merger price increase and show 
causation.26  By contrast, an excluded rival may claim lost profits or 
sales as damages.27 
The 2020 VMG must be regarded as a very considerable 
improvement over any Agency or judicial policy statement in the past.  
They are certainly not the final word and one anticipates that they will 
be revised from time to time, just as the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
have been.  The balance of this paper examines some of the most 
important features of the Guidelines’ approach to vertical mergers. 
The VMG’s Theories of  Harm 
Foreclosure and Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC) 
 Historically the economics of vertical relationships spoke of 
vertically related “markets,” usually described as an upstream market 
and a downstream market.  For example, in a case such as Brown Shoe, 
manufacturing of leather shoes was the upstream market and retailing 
was the downstream market. By contrast, the VMG speak of a 
“relevant market” as the market where a threat to competition is to be 
investigated.  In addition are one or more “related products,” which 
can be either vertically related to the relevant market or else 
complementary.28  This usage is part of a progression in merger 
 
24See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR, AND 
CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶340 (5th ed. 2021). 
2515 U.S.C. §26. 
262A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, supra note __, ¶395. 
27Id., ¶397. 
28VMG, supra note __, §3. 
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analysis away from traditional market definition/market share 
assessment and toward examination of bargaining relationships.  Here, 
as in the case of “unilateral effects” horizontal mergers, traditional 
market definitions are not always necessary to the analysis.29 
On the other hand, older language in the case law seems to 
require a market definition.30 Problematically, relatively recent 
language in the 2018 AmEx decision also requires a market definition 
in cases involving “vertical restraints.”31  The Court in that case was 
not referencing mergers and was speaking of §1 of the Sherman Act.  
Nevertheless, the theories of harm in vertical restraints cases are 
analogous to those in most merger cases.  Enforcers and economists 
evaluating vertical mergers may have to confront the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s statement.  One troublesome implication of the AmEx 
Court’s language is that it turns into a question of law something that 
has always been and should be treated as a question of fact.32 
The VMGs acknowledge several ways that a vertical merger 
might harm competition by raising rivals’ costs (RRC), which means 
“increasing the price or lowering the quality” of the related product.  
This is a product that the rivals buy from or sell to the now merged 
firm.  In the Guidelines the RRC theory and foreclosure are grouped 
together, in a more general discussion of unilateral effects.33  Many of 
the RRC theories of harm depend on assumptions about bargaining 
behavior and outcomes.34 
 
29See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶913-914 (4th ed. 2017). 
30See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1963) (interpreting 
Clayton Act’s “section of the country” and “line of commerce” language as 
requiring, respectively, a geographic market and a product market); and see 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.1 (6th ed. 2020). 
31Ohio v. American Express co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018). 
32On the Supreme Court’s tendency to turn factual questions of economics 
into questions of law, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in 
Antitrust Economics, __ Boston Univ. L. Rev. __ (2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508832.  
33VMG, supra note __, §4.a. 
34The theory of RRC dates back to seminal work done in the 1980s.  See 
Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. 
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As historically developed in the courts, “foreclosure” was very 
largely a binary concept.  Practices such as exclusive dealing or tying 
foreclosed when they made it contractually impossible for a rival of 
the contracting party to do business in a market, and thus excluded it.  
For example, a truck manufacturer might acquire a producer of wheels 
and brakes and then refuse to sell these essential inputs to rival truck 
makers.35 
Raising rivals’ costs (RRC) is, in essence, a “metered” 
alternative to foreclosure. Incrementally raising a rivals’ costs 
eventually hits a point where the rival can no longer compete, and then 
we have foreclosure.  Short of that, however, raising its costs can still 
produce competitive harm by creating an umbrella that will permit the 
defendant to raise its own prices.  The theory of RRC is an inescapable 
conclusion from marginalist economics, in which virtually everything 
is graduated, and it is hard to see why some people doubted it.36  The 
theory was implicitly recognized in the antitrust case law at least as far 
back as American Can, where the defendant bought up exclusive rights 
on all the best can making technology in order to relegate competitors 
to inferior manufacturing methods.37  The theory of RRC rests on the 
simple observation that a practice that makes it more costly for a 
competitor to do business can harm competition even though the firm 
is not forced out of the market.38  This is particularly true of practices 
that can force a price increase in a rival’s inputs.  The harm is 
measured, not by the competitor’s demise, but rather by the increase 
in equilibrium prices. 
RRC and Bargaining Theory 
 A focal point of vertical merger analysis under the VMG is 
mergers that change the bargaining position of the post-merger firm, 
 
ECON. REV. 267 (1983); and Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to achieve Power Over 
Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
35Fruehauf corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
36See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 2001) (RRC 
is “not a happy formula”). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the 
Sherman Act, 72 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 147, 159 (2005). 
37United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D.Md. 1916), app. dism’d, 
256 U.S. 706 (1921). 
38Salop & Scheffman, supra note __. 
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resulting in higher prices.  Although the theory derived from Cournot’s 
writings in the nineteenth century the modern theory depends heavily 
on work that John Nash and others did in the 1950s and after.39  
Bargaining theory also drives a great deal of “unilateral effects” 
analysis in horizontal merger cases,40 and has had a more limited role 
in patent damages determinations.41 
Despite its long pedigree, the bargaining economics of vertical 
mergers can become quite complex.  The result can be dueling experts’ 
reports that are beyond the ability of most judges to understand.  This 
fact has produced judicial resistance and may have affected the 
outcome in the AT&T/Time Warner case.42  In such cases the court 
should consider appointing a neutral expert to evaluate the conflicting 
claims.  While the use of third-party experts is cumbersome and costly, 
much is at stake in a large vertical merger case, and the parties should 
have sufficient resources to cover it.  Judge Posner approved such an 
approach in a case that contemplated a jury trial,43 and it is even more 
readily adaptable to a bench trial in a civil merger challenge. 
Nash bargaining theory considers how a change in two 
bargainers’ reservation prices might affect the equilibrium result of 
their bargain.  For example, Jack wants to purchase a refrigerator from 
 
39John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); Ariel 
Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 
97 (1982).  For general discussions, see MARTIN OSBORNE AND ARIEL 
RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990); ABHINAY MUTHOO, 
BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS (1999). 
40See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive 
Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
COMPETITION LAW (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press 2005); Steven W. 
Salant, Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, Losses from Horizontal 
Merger: the Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on 
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, 98 Q.J. ECON. 185 (1983). 
41See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
42United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C.Cir. 2019).  See 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, §9.5. 
43 See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation (HFCS), 295 
F.3d 651, 665 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003) (creating a 
procedure for selecting a neutral expert in a situation involving a dispute 
between warring regression models). 
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Jane.  The most Jack is willing to pay is $100 and the least Jane is 
willing to accept is $60.  That leaves $40 worth of surplus, or 
bargaining room, so the parties should be able to reach a deal.  But 
what will the price be?  In a competitive market it would be the sellers’ 
marginal cost, so most of the surplus would go to Jack.  By contrast, if 
Jane is a monopolist and the buy side is competitive, then most of the 
surplus would go to Jane.  In a bilateral monopoly, where neither party 
sees good alternatives the parties will make a deal but under the classic 
theory the price will be indeterminate.44 
One important contribution of John Nash and subsequent game 
theorists such as Ariel Rubinstein was to show that under a broad and 
plausible range of assumptions the equilibrium price would tend 
toward an even split of the surplus.  This result has been confirmed in 
many theoretical and empirical models.45 How close to even can 
depend on several factors, including each party’s risk aversion, 
transaction costs and how evenly they are balanced,  identity of the 
first mover, quality of information about own and others’ preferences, 
the bargaining power or “toughness” of the parties, and time horizons. 
In general, the models as well as the experiments that begin with equal 
risk aversion, bargaining power, and information quality arrive at 
equilibria at or very close to a 50-50 split.46 
To the extent there is an imbalance the results may differ.  For 
example, a more risk averse bargainer will get less of the surplus.  
Bargainers with more bargaining power will get more.  This could 
have important implications for merger policy.  To the extent that a 
vertical merger increases the post-merger firm’s bargaining power the 
bargaining outcome is more likely to be greater than a 50% share of 
the surplus.  That could also be the case if the seller is a risk neutral 
firm and the buyer is a risk averse customer.  The seller would get more 
than half of the surplus.  A priori, there is no reason for thinking that 
the post-merger firm would get less than half of the surplus. 
 
44See Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, and Richard E. Romano, A 
Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989). 
45Po-Hsuan Lin, et al, General Economic Principles of Bargaining and 
Trade: Evidence from 2000 Classroom Experiments, NATURE (HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR) (Aug. 2020), available at 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0916-8#citeas. 
46 Ibid. 
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The role of transaction costs is interesting.  In the standard 
Coasean literature high transaction costs generally interfere with the 
market’s ability to reach joint maximizing equilibria.47 In bilateral 
monopoly situations, however, positive transaction costs can actually 
induce an equilibrium by making bargaining rounds costly.48  The 
story is similar to the bargaining that occurs in the Coase Theorem 
literature, where two people are in conflict over  a particular legal 
entitlement, such as a physician’s annoyance at a neighboring 
confectioner’s noisy mortar and pestle.49 Coase concluded that an 
efficient bargain would result in an exchange any time the buyer’s 
reservation price was higher than the seller’s.  For example, if the 
physician valued the right to be free from the noise at $500, while the 
confectioner valued continued operation at $400, the two would 
conclude an agreement under which the confectioner would shut 
down. The term “shut down” here actually describes a range of 
possibilities that may fall short of complete shut down, such as 
reducing activity levels to less harmful levels, or installing devices that 
reduce or eliminate the harm.  If the confectioner had a legal right to 
operate, the physician would have to pay for this shut down.  The 
amount would be indeterminate, but somewhere between $400 and 
$500. 
On the question of how the surplus would be divided, Coase 
himself intuited but never proved that the two parties would divide the 
surplus evenly.  He drew this intuition in response to a literature that 
emerged in the 1980s about the failure of a core, or bargaining 
equilibrium, under the Coase theorem.  His response was that as soon 
as you account for transaction costs bargaining must eventually end.  
Rational maximizers will realize that there is more to be had from 
 
47See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
48On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and 
Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 970 (1990); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative 
Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519, 524-526 (2002). 
49Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, (1883), 32 Reports of Cases 
Decided by the English Courts 837.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1960). 
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reaching a deal than endless bargaining.  Further, the most likely 
outcome is an even split.50 
If an equal division of the surplus is a likely outcome, a change 
in reservation prices will affect the equilibrium bargain in the same 
direction and by half the amount of the change.  For example, in the 
refrigerator example Jack was willing to pay $100 and Jane was 
willing to accept $60, so an even split price would be $80.  What if 
Jane’s options change?  Perhaps as a result of some change in 
circumstances she can make the sale elsewhere at a price of $70.  As a 
result, her opportunity costs and her reservation price to Jack is at least 
$70 as well.  Now the Nash equilibrium will split the difference 
between $70 and $100, or $85. 
A vertical merger will raise a seller’s reservation price when it 
makes alternative transactions more attractive.  Typically, the change 
results from a change in opportunity costs that results from the 
availability of some new alternative.  To hypothesize some facts from 
the AT&T/Time-Warner case, prior to the merger TW’s assets 
consisted of an enormous amount of highly desirable video content 
subject to high fixed costs, very low short-run marginal costs, and non-
rivalrous output.  The last attribute means simply that a single digital 
program, such as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, can be 
licensed an infinite number of times.  In the absence of any restraints 
on pricing, and with the power to price discriminate, TW’s maximizing 
strategy would be to license every taker willing to pay more than 
marginal cost. It would have no incentive to block any customer 
because that would simply mean less revenue. 
After the merger with AT&T, however, TW faces a different 
calculus. AT&T owns DirecTV, whose satellite broadcasting 
competes with consumer cable, Dish Network, and other TV 
programming nationwide. So now it is not only a producer of video 
 
50RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 162 (1988).  See 
also Ronald H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 
24 J.L. & ECON. 183, 184 (1981) (responding to critique that under Coase 
theorem there would be no equilibrium by illustrating repeated rounds of 
bargaining converging on even division of the surplus). See Varouj A. 
Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 
J.L. & Econ. 175 (1981).  For good discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683386
2020 Vertical Mergers 13 
 
content, it is also a consumer in behalf of its subscription customers.  
This may give it an incentive to either black out content or charge 
higher prices to rival program retailers.  For example, a price increase 
from $2 to $3 may not have been profit maximizing prior to the merger.  
However, after the merger AT&T/TW might be able to recapture some 
of the lost revenue if some customers respond to the price increase by 
switching away from a competing cable company to DirecTV. 
The effect will be to raise AT&T/TW’s reservation price to 
outside distributors of programming and, accordingly, the equilibrium 
sale price will increase.  In sum, a price increase that was not profitable 
prior to the merger is profitable after, once we consider recaptured 
income that comes from people who switch to DirecTV. 
This analysis of revenue recapture is not fundamentally 
different from what occurs in unilateral effects merger cases.  Prior to 
the merger a particular price increase produces so many lost sales that 
it is unprofitable.  To the extent some of these sales go to the acquired 
firm, however, the post-merger firm recaptures that revenue and the 
price increase becomes profitable.  It is also captured for vertical 
merger analysis by the development of relatively easy-to-use tools 
such as the Vertical Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index, or vGUPPI, 
which measures changes in incentives that serve to increase the post-
merger firm’s profit-maximizing price.51 
Predicting the size of the price increase requires an inquiry into 
how the acquisition would change the sales calculus of AT&T after the 
TW content is folded into the firm.  This would require examining the 
payoffs and costs, including margins and volume of lost and recaptured 
sales. 
Merger law does not require the government as enforcer to 
quantify the size of the price increase with any precision.  Since the 
government is seeking only an injunction, it simply needs to show the 
existence of harm under a “where the effect may be substantially to 
lessen competition” standard.  As a result, showing sufficient harm to 
enjoin a merger on this basis need not require an assumption that the 
 
51Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 
1962 (2018); Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, VGuppi: Scoring Unilateral 
Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013). 
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parties will split the surplus in half, but only that the equilibrium price 
will rise as the post-merger firm’s reservation price increases. 
Estimating the size of the price increase requires a deeper dig.  
That would be necessary, for example, if the action had been brought 
by a private plaintiff purchaser seeking damages.  It would have to 
quantify the overcharge.  However, an action for damages would 
necessarily be post-acquisition, because no damages would ordinarily 
result until after the merger occurred.  In that case there could be 
alternative mechanisms for estimating damages, such as before-and-
after or perhaps yardstick methods.52  If the private plaintiff is seeking 
to enjoin a contemplated but not consummated merger the statutory 
standard is “threatened loss or damage,” and no quantification is 
necessary.53 
 One analogue that has produced some case law is the 
computation of patent damages, where there has been significant 
judicial resistance to the use of Nash bargaining models. The Patent 
Act prescribes a market-mimicking approach to assessing damages, 
that must be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”54 One 
historical starting point was the “25% rule,” which simply assumed 
that 25% of an infringer’s profits from the infringement would be paid 
out as a royalty, but in Uniloc the Federal Circuit rejected that 
approach as having no foundation.55 
The Nash bargaining approach provides an alternative by 
assuming as bargaining parameters that the royalty be not less than 
zero and not more than the defendant’s entire profit from use of the 
invention.  That suggests that the Nash bargaining solution would be a 
fifty-fifty split of the infringer’s profits.  If the patentee also practices 
the patent, then licensing may involve some lost product sales, and this 
would tend to raise the market-based equilibrium royalty. In any event, 
the Federal Circuit has also rejected this approach, at least for the time 
being.56 The result is that patent damages are most frequently 
 
52See 2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, supra note __, at 
¶¶392, 395b, 397f. 
5315 U.S.C. §26. 
5435 U.S.C. §284. 
55 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
56E.g., Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(patent damages; evidence based on Nash bargaining model inadmissible).  
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computed by using a yardstick methodology along with a hodgepot of 
factors under the so-called Georgia-Pacific test that attempts mainly 
to identify arms’ length bargains over similar patents and similar acts 
of infringement.57 
Categorical rejection of such methodologies seems wrong-
headed.  To be sure, the bargaining theory is complex and rests on 
many assumptions.  But the hodgepot of factors that constitute the 
Georgia-Pacific test is certainly no better, and the 25% rule is nothing 
but an unsupported generalization. 
In any event, the problem of predicting merger harm is 
fundamentally much easier because it does not require quantification 
in the sense that the measurement of damages does, but only a showing 
that the effect of the merger may be to increase prices. 
Nash Bargaining and Merger Efficiencies 
Assessing consumer harm a vertical merger can become more 
difficult if the merger produces significant and merger-specific 
efficiencies.  Here the Merger Guidelines state that a prima facie 
unlawful merger can be saved by merger specific efficiencies that will 
be passed on to consumers sufficiently that the post-merger price will 
be no higher than the pre-merger price.58 The term “merger specific” 
means that the efficiency cannot readily be attained by means other 
 
See also Vaporstream, Inc. v. Snap, Inc., 2020 WL 2543814 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 
10, 2020) (rejecting expert testimony on damages using Nash bargaining 
model); Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 798 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1119-
1121 (N.D.Cal. 2011) (copyright; refusing to admit expert testimony on 
damages using Nash bargaining model); Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft corp., 
2014 WL 350062 (D.Del. 2014). Cf. AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 
F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (not explicitly referencing Nash bargaining 
model, but approving expert’s testimony of 50-50 split when it was within 
the historical range of actual royalties). See William Choi & Roy Weinstein, 
An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 
56-60 (2001). 
57Georgia-Pacific corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Yl 
1970); see Utex Indus., Inc. v. Wiegand, 2020 WL 873985 (S. D. Tex. Feb. 
21, 2020) (dicta approving yardstick method for patent damages).  For a 
severe critique, see Erik Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent 
Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 REV. LITIG. 379 (2018). 
58VMG, supra note __, §6. 
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than the merger.  In cases with offsetting efficiencies the predicted 
price increase and the size of the efficiency offset would need to be 
estimated sufficiently to show that the post-merger price is no higher 
than the pre-merger price.  While establishing this can be difficult, it 
still does not require a determination of how much prices will go up, 
but only that they will go up.  Prediction becomes more difficult as 
cases are closer. 
The burden of proof for defenses should generally be on the 
defendants.  Defenses are all about engineering costs, economies of 
scale, distribution, management, transaction costs, eliminated 
coordination costs, IP portfolios, or make-vs-buy alternatives.  For all 
of these the defendant is in a better position to have information about 
them and how they will be affected by the merger.59  Indeed, predicted 
efficiencies provide the motives for any merger whose gain comes 
from a source other than a price increase.  Presumably a rational 
acquiring firm has evaluated these possibilities before it made its 
decision.  The merging firms are also in the better position in most 
cases to show that the claimed efficiencies are verifiable and merger 
specific. 
Bargaining Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Relative Robustness 
The Nash bargaining evaluation of vertical mergers may 
produce a certain amount of skepticism among judges, who might 
regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as 
excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.   
However, we have been there before.  The introduction of 
concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines 
was initially met with skepticism.  Gradually they were accepted as 
judges became more comfortable with them. 
In fact, the theory that relates a particular reading on a 
concentration index to the risk of noncompetitive outcomes from 
horizontal mergers involves at least as much conjecture as does the 
bargaining theory that the Nash model contemplates.60  A few early 
 
59See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶970f (4th ed. 2016). 
60See 4 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶930-932 
(4th ed. 2016). 
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decisions showed strong skepticism about the HHI and either rejected 
or seriously qualified its use.61 
The HHI as used in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
expresses a generalization about diverse anticompetitive strategies, 
including explicit or follow-the-leader collusion as well as 
noncooperative Cournot pricing under a variety of behavioral 
assumptions.  The HHI itself is mathematically derived from a pure 
Cournot theory62 and used even though most models of coordinated 
interaction today deviate significantly from the original Cournot 
assumptions.63 Sometimes the behavioral assumptions driving these 
models are inconsistent.  For example, a factor such as disparities in 
firm size may serve to raise the Cournot equilibrium price, but at the 
same time it may make it more difficult for a cartel to reach a stable 
agreement.  That is, sometimes the assumptions pull in opposite 
directions. 
What they generally share in common, however, is the view 
that the competitive threat varies inversely with the number of firms in 
a market and directly with the increase in concentration. Disparities in 
firm size are perhaps a little less relevant but important nonetheless. If 
the fear is a cooperative form of collusion the resulting price is 
typically the same no matter how many participants, although the 
likelihood of success and cartel stability is greater as the number of 
participants is smaller. Likewise, in a cartel the price does not vary 
systematically with firm size.  By contrast, if the fear is noncooperative 
Cournot-style oligopoly then the size of the price increase depends on 
both the number of firms and size disparities. 
 
61E.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 748-749 
n.38 (D. Md. 1976) (rejecting HHI); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 
F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (HHI okay as alternative to CR4). 
62See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
63On the relation of the HHI to pure Cournot assumptions see Daniel P. 
O’Brien and Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership, 
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 594-596 
(2000).  See also William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx 
& Steven P. Schulenberg, Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (2009); Janusz A. Ordover, Coordinated Effects in 
Merger Analysis: An Introduction, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 411, 414. 
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All of this, including the manifold variety of models, is well 
established in the industrial organization literature on collusion and 
oligopoly.64  The concentration thresholds in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines do no more than capture a rough generalization about the 
link between higher prices, the number of firms in a market, their size 
disparities, and the extent of the increase that results from the merger. 
 The judicial decisions today rarely revisit these issues in any 
detail, and most willingly conclude that changes in concentration 
indexes are predictive of merger outcomes. Of course, the value of an 
economic model is not its descriptive realism but its testability.  
Empirically, the links between concentration, concentration increases, 
and post-merger price increases resulting from horizontal mergers 
does fairly well, although which is more important can be debated.65 
The use of concentration indexes in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines has one thing going for it that the vertical merger measures 
do not, and that is the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.  In the 
Philadelphia Bank decision the Court wrote that a numerical 
prediction of competitive consequences: 
is sound only if it is based upon a firm understanding of the 
structure of the relevant market; yet the relevant economic 
data are both complex and elusive. * * * [U]nless 
businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger 
with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded. 
* * * So also, we must be alert to the danger of subverting 
congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic 
investigation. 
[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm [1] 
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, 
 
64E.g., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, Ch. 6, in HANDBOOK 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329-414 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert 
Willig, eds., 1989).  See generally 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY AND 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini, eds., 
2018), esp. Chs. 2,3, 5, 6, 7. 
65See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014).  Cf. Volker Nocke & 
Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 
(NBER, 2020), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27533 (arguing 
that the concentration increase is more important than the level). 
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and [2] results in a significant increase in the concentration of 
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined [3] in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not 
likely to have such anticompetitive effects. * * *66 
This numbered set of criteria claims widespread support.  What 
we want to know about a horizontal merger is something about the 
post-merger market share and the amount by which the merger 
increases market concentration.67  It is unclear that the Court in 
Philadelphia Bank had any particular model of collusion or oligopoly 
in mind.  Indeed, it is not even clear that the Court was concerned about 
high prices.  It may just as possibly have been concerned about the 
post-merger firm’s ability to undersell rivals. 
Another attribute of concentration indexes is that they cannot 
be applied until a market has been defined.  Market definitions are 
always problematic, particularly in differentiated markets such as are 
common subjects of merger litigation.  To the extent a market 
definition includes differentiated products they are treated as perfect 
competitors, which is wrong and understates the power that individual 
firms can exert. To the extent they exclude differentiated products they 
treat them as if they do not compete at all, which is also wrong and 
exaggerates power.68 Indeed, these under- and over-inclusive 
characteristics of market definition largely undermine its value in the 
treatment of unilateral effects mergers. 
The best case for use of the HHI or any concentration index is 
an informed hunch that the threat of noncompetitive behavior gets 
bigger as the number of effective players in a market diminishes.  
Empirically, that hunch turns out to be fairly robust, although the HHI 
itself gives an illusion of precision that is not justified by reality.69 
 
66United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-363 (1963) 
(bracketed numbers added). 
67 On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal 
Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 Yale L.J. 1996 
(2018). 
68See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 
(2010); 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶910e. 
69See John E. Kwoka, The Herfindahl Index in Theory and Practice, 30 
ANTITRUST BULL. 915 (1985). 
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Seen in this light, the emergence of unilateral effects theory 
was a significant improvement in analysis.70  Dispensing with 
traditional market definition, it focuses on substitution rates, or 
elasticities, among competitive pairings of firms. Where the data are 
available, measurement of these is almost certainly much better than 
use of the HHI as a predictor of collusive interaction. 
Stacked up against this history, the Nash bargaining theory that 
suggests a presumptive fifty-fifty split of the surplus is defensible – 
certainly sufficiently defensible to meet §7’s “may substantially lessen 
competition” standard.  Nevertheless, the theory places a burden on 
both the agencies as well as consulting and academic economists to 
test their analysis empirically and also produce simplifying 
methodologies that make the analysis more accessible.  That can only 
improve over time.  This places a premium on continuous empirical 
investigation of merger outcomes, as we have done for horizontal 
mergers. 
 Even in the presence of substantial merger specific 
efficiencies, the precise location of the Nash bargaining outcome will 
be crucial only in close cases.  Given the very small number of times 
efficiencies of this nature and magnitude have been found, this 
problem should not arise frequently.  The problem of elimination of 
double marginalization, discussed below, presents some different 
issues.71 
Profit-Maximization and Bargaining Assumptions 
Nash bargaining methodologies assume that business firms are 
rational profit-maximizers.  Such an assumption is essential to 
economics generally, as well as to rational antitrust policy.  For their 
part, judges must accept and internalize the fact that rational actor 
assumptions are the things that makes economic prediction possible.  
To that end, it was a serious misstep in the AT&T/TW litigation for the 
 
70Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to 
Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010); 4 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶914e; Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers 
with Unilateral Effects: A Simpler and More Accurate Alternative to Market 
Definition (FTC, Feb. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf. 
71See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683386
2020 Vertical Mergers 21 
 
district judge to acknowledge a defense argument that after the merger 
the firm would not seek to maximize overall profits but would consider 
the profits of each division separately.72  Accepting an assumption of 
that nature would not only defeat vertical merger analysis, it would 
make a wide range of economic policy making based on prediction 
impossible. 
Further, neither the courts nor the parties addressed the 
implications of this defense argument on the other defense – namely, 
that the merger would eliminate double marginalization, discussed 
below.  The defendant was effectively arguing that the post-merger 
firm was not a profit-maximizer when TW computed its licensing 
prices, but that it was a profit-maximizer for purposes of considering 
double marginalization.  The two positions are inconsistent.  Double 
marginalization occurs when firms do not coordinate their output and 
prices, and the defense concerning TW’s pricing asserted that they 
would not be coordinating after the merger either.  
Market Structure and Product Differentiation 
 Competition is always about the existence and availability of 
alternatives.  They are what force a firm to keep its price down, 
knowing that a customer will be able to buy from someone else. The 
bargaining theory that guides vertical merger analysis depends heavily 
on the availability of alternatives.  A bargainer’s willingness to pay a 
particular seller for any good is substantially a function of the amount 
it would have to pay for a similar good from someone else.  To take an 
obvious example, if a grocery chain acquires an egg producer and the 
egg market is competitive, the acquisition is unlikely to have much 
effect on the chain’s ability to force higher egg costs on its rivals.  They 
have plenty of alternatives and all eggs are alike.  If the post-merger 
firm attempts to jack up the price of wholesale eggs they will go 
elsewhere. 
 One of the more important examples given in the VMG is 
unfortunate.  The illustration involves oranges, an undifferentiated 
commodity.  The example that the VMG give is that by acquiring an 
orange supplier an orange juice manufacturer is able to charge rivals a 
 
72United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 222-223 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683386
22 Vertical Mergers Oct. 2020 
 
higher price for oranges, or perhaps stop supplying to them 
altogether.73 
 That illustration would be much more plausible if it involved a 
more specialized manufactured product and a more concentrated 
market with fewer alternatives.  For example, it could be a 
microprocessor chip or perhaps even the heavy duty truck wheels in 
the Fruehauf case.74  Oranges for the United States market are grown 
by thousands of domestic growers, situated mainly in California, 
Florida, Texas, and Arizona.  In addition are significant foreign 
imports, mainly from Mexico, Chile, South Africa and Australia.75  To 
be sure, transportation costs may limit some processing markets to 
local areas, although the Example does not say that and the fact of 
transportation from far off places such as Australia makes it unlikely. 
 The strategy outlined in the VMG’s orange example works 
much better in a case such as AT&T/Time-Warner because TW’s 
content is unique, significantly differentiated, and highly desirable.  
Rival cable companies certainly need TW’s content much more than 
any particular orange juice maker needs a particular supplier’s 
oranges.  What would be helpful is some more factually realistic 
information about exactly how a vertical acquisition goes about 
denying access to rivals or raising their costs.  The Guidelines decline 
to require a minimum market share, but they do state that they “may 
rely on evidence of head-to-head competition between one merging 
firm and rivals that trade with the other merging firm when evaluating 
unilateral effects,” which includes the foreclosure and RRC theories.76 
 This formulation reflects a reality that has already been 
developed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines analysis of 
unilateral effects mergers.  Even for firms that compete with one 
another, the elasticity of substitution among various pairs of 
competitors can vary.  In a differentiated market not every 
competitor’s offering represents an equally good alternative.  As a 
 
73VMG, §4.a, Example 2. 
74Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
75 See https://www.producenews.net/markets-and-trends/10662-citrus-
import-demand-up-and-growing-in-the-united-
states#:~:text=South%20Africa%2C%20Chile%2C%20Mexico%20and,U.
S.%20market%20essentially%20since%202003. 
76 VMG, §2. 
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result, the question of how costly it is to deny a specialized input to a 
manufacturer is one of degree.  After a vertical merger a firm that raises 
its price for the related product above pre-merger levels will still lose 
sales, just as the related product did prior to the merger. The question 
is how many and how much will be recaptured at the other level.  In 
the case of oranges, the likely answer is zero.  In more concentrated 
and differentiated markets recapture is more likely. 
For example, if post-merger AT&T/TW raise the rates on TW 
content, companies that compete with AT&T will reduce their 
purchases, but by not purchasing they will lose customers who desire 
TW content to DirecTV or one of AT&T’s regional cable companies.77 
Or in Fruehauf, if the post-merger firm raises the price of wheels to 
Fruehauf’s competitors, those competitors will face higher costs.  On 
the one hand they will purchase fewer wheels.  On the other, truck 
trailer customers will respond by purchasing more trailers from 
Fruehauf.78  The tradeoff is what determines profitability, and the 
equilibrium price after the merger could be higher. 
What Happened to Intellectual Property? 
One lamentable omission in the Guidelines is discussion of 
intellectual property rights and the role that they might play in vertical 
mergers.  There is no sustained treatment of patents and no mention at 
all of licensing. 
IP rights have many distinct features that can affect vertical 
merger analysis. One is the fact that IP rights are nonrivalrous, which 
means that when they can permit unlimited copying.  To illustrate, one 
of the foreclosure complaints in the FTC’s unsuccessful Fruehauf case 
was that the wheels and brakes acquired by a truck manufacturer had 
experienced supply shortages.79  The court noted that these items had 
“been subject to periodic shortages in the past,”80 and the merger 
increased the likelihood that the post-merger firm would favor its own 
parent rather than outside purchasers.  Whatever one thinks of that as 
a rationale for estimating foreclosure from a vertical merger, it has no 
 
77United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 222-223 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
78Fruehauf corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).  
79Ibid. 
80Id. at 349. 
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application to an IP right such as licenses to the digital video content 
at issue in Time-Warner. The post-merger firm could consume 
internally an indefinite number of copies of the Harry Potter movies 
and still have an unlimited number of copies left over for outside 
buyers if it chose to license them. 
 Pulling the other way, another fact about IP rights is that they 
can promote product differentiation and, in the absence of a license, 
limit copying.  This tends to narrow or make more costly the available 
alternatives. By acquiring a portfolio of valuable patents or other IP 
rights a post-merger manufacturer may be able to raise its licensing 
fees to rival manufacturers.  If these competing manufacturers cannot 
find adequate substitutes they will have to raise the prices of their 
output, and some customers will substitute back to the post-merger 
firm’s manufactured output.  The AT&T/TW case presented precisely 
this story in the context of copyrighted video content.  Without a 
license to Harry Potter, a rival firm can certainly make its own movie, 
but making it is far more costly than licensing an existing copy and 
success by no means assured. 
One of the areas in which vertical mergers present the most 
significant competitive threats are those that involve significant IP 
licensing, both of patents and copyrighted media.  Further, the fact that 
these rights are both nonrivalrous and have very low marginal costs is 
likely to have a significant impact on the range over which the parties 
will bargain.  The unintegrated holder of an IP portfolio has very low 
variable costs, no constraint on production, and thus an incentive to 
license to everyone, particularly if price discrimination is readily 
available.  By contrast, the vertically integrated holder of IP rights 
must balance revenue gains from licensing against revenue losses from 
the vertically related product. 
Efficiencies and Double Marginalization 
Introduction 
 Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers that threaten 
to lessen competition but says nothing about offsetting efficiencies.  
Indeed, it is not clear that an efficiencies defense is necessary or even 
wise. An evaluation of net impact on competition should already take 
efficiencies into account.  This is clear in unilateral effects cases, 
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where the models simultaneously account for upward pricing pressure 
and offsetting cost reductions to predict a post-merger price. 
 The idea of an efficiencies “defense” with an offsetting burden 
of proof really grew out of the welfare tradeoff model that Williamson 
developed in the 1960s, which offset consumer harm resulting from an 
output reduction against productive efficiency gains.81  Current merger 
analysis does not view the relationship that way. Basically the 
proponents of a merger must show that there will be no consumer harm 
at all.  As a result, all of the effects of the merger would be rolled into 
a prediction of the post-merger price. 
 Most of the traditional discussion of vertical merger 
efficiencies was about integration. To the extent that a merger 
facilitates the physical integration of production, costs can decline.  
This fact was not always offered as a defense and in the 1960s even 
became a rationale for condemning some mergers. One example is 
Allis-Chalmers, a vertical merger case that condemned the merger of 
a manufacturer of rolling mills in the steel industry and the electrical 
wiring harnesses used to transmit power to such mills.82 The court not 
only recognized the efficiency but actually condemned the merger for 
that reason.  The court concluded that the merger would raise entry 
barriers into the production of rolling mills, because it would create 
“the only company capable of designing, producing and installing a 
complete metal rolling mill.”83 
 
81 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
82Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus. 414 F.2d 506, 515-518 
(3d Cir. 1969). 
83Cf. the “portfolio effects” or “range effects” theory that has had some use 
in the EU but not the U.S., to condemn a vertical or conglomerate merger if 
the ability of the post-merger firm to develop or sell the two products 
together threatened to drive unintegrated rivals out of business.  The EU 
relied on the theory in 2005 to block the merger of General Electric Co. and 
Honeywell, Inc., See Case No. COMP/M 2220, General 
Electric/Honeywell, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.  
See Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition 
Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (2002); William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate 
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 Production cost savings have always played a significant role 
in vertical merger decisions and should be treated as qualifying 
efficiencies.  One warning here is that a merger in and of itself does 
not create a single plant integrating the two levels, but only a single 
firm owning two plants.  As a result, production shifts and perhaps 
even new plant construction or outfitting will be necessary.  This is far 
less likely to occur in a case such as AT&T/Time-Warner, where 
production of cable or satellite access will happen on one set of 
platforms and production of the digital content on another.  The 
savings are unlikely to occur in production costs. 
 The Government’s Vertical Merger Guidelines say very little 
about specific efficiency effects from vertical mergers, except to 
rename them “procompetitive effects” and combine the analysis with 
the elimination of double marginalization (EDM).84  Nor do the 
Guidelines discuss burdens of proof.  As noted previously, however, 
the burden of proving efficiencies should sensibly rest on the 
defendant, who almost always has better control over the relevant 
evidence.85 
Transaction Cost Savings 
 In addition to production costs savings, which refer mainly to 
engineering and physical integration costs, transaction cost savings 
figure prominently in the analysis of vertical mergers.  The costs of 
reaching and enforcing a bargain may be high in some cases, and 
vertical ownership can eliminate these.  If a firm can produce a widget 
internally at the same cost as that of an outside seller, then any 
significant cost of using the market gives the advantage to internal 
production. 
 The origin of many of our ideas about transaction cost savings 
is Ronald Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm. Coase argued 
that firm boundaries are explained by transaction costs, which he 
termed “marketing costs.”86 He compared the costs of purchasing an 
 
Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 
GMU L. REV. 533 (2002). 
84VMG, supra note __, §6. 
85See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
86Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 392 
(1937) (“… the operation of a market costs something and by forming an 
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input against the costs of internal production.  The firm will choose the 
method that results in the best payoff, given that transacting is costly.  
The aggregation of these choices determines the boundaries of the 
firm. 
In making this calculation, merger would seem to be a relevant 
alternative that should have been on the table.  However, Coase never 
discussed them.  For any input alpha, Coase assumed that the firm 
would either purchase it or make it for itself.  He did not mention the 
possibility that the firm might acquire an alpha-producing firm. 
Nevertheless, transaction costs savings are relevant to merger analysis 
when the costs of purchasing and operating a firm are less than the cost 
of either new entry or purchasing the finished input on a market.  The 
hypothetical firm in Coase’s model actually has three choices rather 
than two: procurement of alpha on the market, entry into self-
production, or purchase of an alpha manufacturer.  It chooses 
whichever of the three promises the best payoff. 
EDM in Vertical Relationships 
The double marginalization problem is best understood as part 
of the transaction cost problem.  It arises when a bargaining 
impediment to coordination limits the ability of two firms with market 
power to reach the joint maximizing position.  Each firm maximizes 
without taking into account that the other firm also has market power.  
As a result, each one takes an excessive monopoly markup, output is 
too low and price too high to be maximizing for either party.87 
Double marginalization is nothing more than a cost of 
transacting, and it can be controlled either by merger or by contractual 
coordination.  If two parties can eliminate a particular transaction cost 
they can both profit. This might occur, for example, if a buyer and 
seller agree to eliminate the services of a broker and deal with each 
other directly.  This method of transaction cost reduction occurs 
 
organisation and allowing some authority (an " entrepreneur ") to direct the 
resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”). 
87For development, see HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra 
note __, §9.2. 
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frequently enough that it was separately addressed by the Robinson-
Patman Act.88 
As a result, the VMG are incorrect to state that the elimination 
of double marginalization is not a “procurement efficiency,” but 
simply a failure of alignment of the economic incentives between the 
merging firms.89  Any transaction cost savings could be assigned or 
divided by the parties through a suitably renegotiated contract. 
As noted above, in The Nature of the Firm Coase discussed 
outside procurement and internal production as alternative ways of 
obtaining an input.  He did not discuss mergers.  There is a good reason 
for his omission: he himself did not believe it. He did speak about 
mergers as an alternative to contracting in his later writing on the 
vertical merger between General Motors and one of its major input 
suppliers, Fisher Body Works.  Coase strongly dissented from the view 
that complexities in contracting explained that merger.  By using side-
payments, two-part contracting or other more complex contracting 
relationship the firms should have been able to achieve joint 
maximizing results. 
The standard theory that asset specificity, sunk costs, or other 
precommitments can cause negotiation breakdown and lead to vertical 
mergers was developed in a well-known paper by Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian (KCA).90  They argued that holdup problems upset a long 
standing bilateral bargaining relationship between Fisher Body and 
GM, which GM was able to resolve only by acquiring Fisher.  Fisher 
Body’s nearby geographic location to GM gave it unique advantages 
as GM’s supplier, and vice-versa, locking the two firms together to the 
extent that contracting with others was more costly.  The fact that auto 
bodies had to be individually designed in a specialized plant and 
guaranteed in sufficient numbers in advance created significant 
 
88See 15 U.S.C. §13c (making it unlawful to give a price discount in lieu of 
brokerage unless the buyer actually performed the brokerage services in 
question).  See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960); and 13 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2362 (4th ed. 2019). 
89VMG, supra note __, §6. 
90Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 
21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). 
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opportunities for holdup.  Each party effectively became a hostage to 
the other.  The result was bargaining breakdowns, or instances in 
which one party did not behave in ways that the other party anticipated.  
Contracting finally broke down when GM wanted to open a new plant 
in Flint, some sixty miles away, and wanted Fisher to build a plant 
there as well.  This resulted from GM’s preference that all elements of 
production be located close together.  Fisher, however, preferred to 
expand output from its existing plant in Detroit. 
The KCA view was that this dispute was an impasse that 
resulted in GM’s acquisition. Coase’s view was that it was soluble by 
contract.  In fact, the parties actually had been able to bargain to the 
joint maximizing position.91 Thereupon a lively and largely unresolved 
debate ensued over what really happened in the Fisher Body case, and 
the extent to which contracting could work as easily as merger to solve 
the problem.92 
The debate over vertical integration and holdup merged themes 
that Coase had developed in his two best-known articles, The Nature 
of the Firm93 and The Problem of Social Cost.94  The first argued that 
the boundaries of a firm are determined by the firm’s continuous 
search to procure inputs in the most cost effective way.  The second 
argued that two traders in a well-functioning market will be able to 
achieve the joint-maximizing solution.  That relationship is too often 
 
91Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 
J. L. & ECON. 15 (2000); Ronald H. Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The 
Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. MAN. 255 
(2006). 
92See Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 
43 J. L. & ECON. 105 (2000); Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel 
Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J. L. & ECON. 67 (2000); Robert F. 
Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body 
Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000).  See also Douglas G. Baird, In 
Coase’s Footsteps, 70 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 23 (2003); Yoshiro Miwa & J. 
Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: 
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2636 (2000);  Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie, and Charles Sabel, 
Pragmatic collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling 
Opportunism,  9 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 443 (2000). 
93See note __. 
94Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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ignored.  For example, Ben Klein’s article responding to the Coase 
critique of the Fisher Body merger relied heavily on Coase’s Nature of 
the Firm, as it should have, but it never cited The Problem of Social 
Cost.95 
Viewed in this perspective, there is more than a little cognitive 
dissonance in the debate over EDM. Anti-interventionist conservatives 
and libertarians rely heavily on Coasean arguments that unless high 
transaction costs get in the way firms will be able to bargain to joint 
maximizing results.  By contrast, regulation creates inalienability rules 
that undermine these results.96 If that is true, however, then double 
marginalization will rarely provide a defense to a vertical merger.  The 
law of vertical mergers deals largely with firms that transact with one 
another routinely, in legally enforceable buy-sell relationships.  Yet for 
some reason they are unable to arrive at joint maximizing agreements. 
One interesting thing about The Problem of Social Cost is that 
most of the actors that appear in it do not bargain with each other 
regularly and there are not well established markets for them to do so.  
In fact, many of the markets are bilateral monopolies. They are 
certainly in a position to sue one another, and do, but the transaction 
costs of litigating are extremely high in comparison with the give and 
take of more conventional markets.  The potential bargainers who 
populate Social Cost are pairs like the doctor and confectioner who 
share a party wall,97 the homeowner and the nearby airport,98 the cattle 
rancher and neighboring farmer,99 the spark-emitting chimney and 
downwind neighbor,100 or the hotel whose addition blocks light to 
sunbathers at an adjacent hotel.101 In all of these cases the parties 
actually go to court rather than solve the problem by bargaining.  The 
principal relationship among all of these is that they are physical 
neighbors, not that they engage in regular buyer-seller contracting.  If 
 
95Klein, Fisher-General Motors, supra note __. 
96For a good statement of the positions, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note __. 
97Id. at 2-3, discussing Sturges v. Bridgeman, (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852. 
98Id. at 25, discussing Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 
245 (1942). 
99Coase, Social Cost, passim. 
100Id. at 11, discussing Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-1879) 
101Id. at 8, discussing Fontainebleu Hotel corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-
Five,Inc., 114 So.2d 357 (1959). 
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anything, contractual solutions to the double marginalization problem 
should be far easier to come by. 
The economics of double marginalization was developed in the 
1950s in a context that tended to view firms as fixed entities unto 
themselves.102   If a firm is simply a nexus of contracts, however, and 
anything that can be accomplished within a firm can also be 
accomplished by a suitably designed contract, then double 
marginalization should not exist.  Two firms contracting with one 
another should be able to solve the problem just as much as two 
different departments or divisions within a single firm. 
As noted previously, by crediting the defense in the 
AT&T/Time-Warner case that post-merger TW would go right on 
maximizing its profits individually, without regard for AT&T, it was 
also implicitly rejecting the argument that the merger would eliminate 
double marginalization.  The defendant’s were saying, in effect, that 
coordination of output would not even occur after the merger.  If that 
were true, then post-merger EDM should not be assumed. 
Complements vs. Vertical Relationships 
A vertical merger typically involves firms who are already in a 
bargaining relationship or are well positioned to be in one.  As Cournot 
originally developed what came to be known as the theory of “Cournot 
complements,” or double marginalization, it involved firms who 
produced monopolized complementary inputs sold to a common 
buyer.103 A well known example is royalty stacking vis-à-vis a licensee 
that needs several patents in order to produce a product.104  Firms that 
 
102E.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 347 (1950).  See also Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral 
Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 
101 (1960) (discussing scholarship to that time). 
103AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99-116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1838). 
104Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent 
Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (2004). 
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sell complementary inputs do not ordinarily deal with one another, and 
as a result coordination is more difficult to achieve. 
For example, suppose a device such as a toaster requires 
licenses from A, B, C & D, each of which owns a patent covering a 
distinct but essential component.  The theory of Cournot complements 
states that each will set a royalty that maximizes its returns individually 
and the sum of the resulting royalties will be too high.  The patentees 
could earn more by coordinating their license fees, and the output gains 
would more than offset the lower royalty rates that they receive. The 
toaster manufacturer would profit because the input costs for making 
toasters would go down.  Consumer would benefit because the price 
of toasters would decline as well. However, if the complementary 
sellers of inputs to a common licensee agreed to coordinate license fees 
with one another they would very likely be guilty of collusion.105 One 
alternative that might eliminate double marginalization while avoiding 
antitrust liability would be pooling, in which the four patentees 
aggregated their patents by cross-licensing and a single entity licensed 
them out to the toaster maker. 
By contrast to sellers of complements, vertically related firms 
deal with each other regularly. Two firms who bargain with one 
another regularly should be able to reach the joint maximizing result, 
and double marginalization is not joint maximizing.  To the extent they 
can coordinate price and output they both will be better off.  Merging 
is of course a way of coordinating price and output, but Coase’s point 
was that the firms should be able to reach that result without having to 
merge. 
The thing that can defeat this result is high transaction costs, 
but in a case that involves durable vertical relationships transaction 
costs should induce the firms to reach a deal more quickly.  In addition, 
another bargaining impediment to EDM was harsh rules against 
vertical restraints such as minimum and maximum resale price 
maintenance.  But those constraints have very largely been removed 
 
105See Erik Hovenkamp, Competition, Inalienability, and the Economic 
Analysis of Patent Law, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 33 (2018). 
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by the Supreme Court.106  EDM may also require price discrimination 
favoring some buyers, but such discrimination rarely raises antitrust 
issues. 
 Contractual EDM is usually superior to a vertical merger 
because it permits the parties to focus on individual inputs.  After all, 
the double marginalization problem usually concerns specific products 
or assets, not necessarily entire firms.  For example, the gasoline 
refiner with market power who sells gasoline to a local retailer with 
market power faces a double marginalization problem with respect to 
gasoline.  For the rest of the local retailer’s business the refiner is 
presumably indifferent.  Even traditional gasoline stations sell tires, 
batteries, and auto repair services.  Gasoline sellers who operate 
through convenience stores sell a great deal more.  The contractual 
solution permits the parties to bargain over the one input, gasoline, 
over which the two are failing to maximize.  By contrast, the merger 
focuses the refiner to go into the retailing business. 
 It is thus quite appropriate for the Agencies evaluating vertical 
mergers to presume that EDM is not a “merger specific” defense.  In 
most cases contractual alternatives should be both superior and 
available.  Significantly, this becomes relevant only after a prima facie 
case against the merger has been made.  Without explicitly assigning 
the burden of proof, the Agencies are thus correct to require the 
merging firms “to provide substantiation for claims that they will 
benefit” from EDM.107  The Guidelines add: 
 In assessing the merger-specificity of the elimination of 
double marginalization, the Agencies typically examine 
whether it would likely be less costly for the merged firm to 
self-supply inputs following the merger than for the 
downstream firm to purchase them from one or more 
independent firms absent the merger. The merging parties’ 
evidence about existing contracting practices is often the best 
 
106See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877 (2007) (overruling per se rule against resale price maintenance); State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling per se rule against maximum 
resale price maintenance). 
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evidence of the price the downstream firm would likely pay for 
inputs absent the merger. The Agencies also consider other 
evidence, such as contracts between similarly situated firms in 
the same industry and contracting efforts considered by the 
merging firms.108 
 The Guidelines then go on, however, to say that they will not 
require bargaining solutions that might “theoretically be achieved” but 
that are “not reflected in documentary evidence.”109  That position is 
needlessly conservative. 
Conclusion 
 The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines are not perfect, but they 
are a significant step in the right direction.  Now, as in the case of 
horizontal mergers, the track record of vertical mergers must be 
evaluated, focusing mainly on the more marginal cases in which a 
merger was approved.  The courts for their part would do best to give 
the Agencies the benefit of the doubt, using third-party court-
appointed experts in difficult cases. 
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